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Introduction
On 3 November 2003, the closing time of the German electronic trading platform Xetra was brought forward from 8.00pm to 5.30pm, while the Frankfurt floor remained open until 8.00pm. Deutsche
Boerse announced in a press release on 3 September 2003 that Xetra was going to close at 5.30pm from 3 November 2003 onwards. This release claims that market participants prefer uniform trading hours across Europe as stock trading becomes increasingly international ).
We analyse the effects of this event on the trading qualities on both platforms, thereby overcoming the limitations of Venkataraman (2001) as pointed out by Madhavan (2001) . Venkataraman (2001) analyses the trade execution costs for the non-anonymous New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) compared with the anonymous Paris Bourse for large and liquid stocks. He finds trading costs in Paris to be higher than at the NYSE by 0.14 percent of the trading volume and concludes that human intermediation may increase liquidity on a stock exchange. In a critical discussion, Madhavan (2001) demonstrates several substantial difficulties with this analysis: Venkataraman (2001) examines two stock exchanges in different countries with different regulatory settings and different sets of stocks that are matched using various algorithms. Moreover, two auction markets are investigated which makes the interpretation of the spreads ambiguous. As we compare the same stocks traded simultaneously on both platforms in continuous trading at the same stock exchange, we are able to report more reliable results than Venkataraman (2001) .
Moreover, our direct comparison of the electronic trading system with the floor provides further evidence regarding the Seppi (1990) hypothesis that broker-facilitated upstairs markets are preferred to electronic downstairs markets by those traders who can credibly convey that their trades are uninformed. Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004) find empirical evidence supporting Seppi (1990) and report total execution costs, and their adverse selection component, to be lower in the upstairs market than downstairs. They argue that the presence of brokers drives down transaction costs in part because these brokers have information about unexpressed liquidity (Grossman (1992) ), and in part because the information asymmetry is lower in a non-anonymous market. Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004) conclude that an electronic exchange needs an upstairs market.
By presenting empirical evidence on the comparison of two trading systems in a clean institutional setting, we also contribute to the more general debate on whether anonymous electronic trading systems provide more or less favourable conditions for investors than the non-anonymous floor. While a few studies find evidence for the electronic system offering lower execution costs than the floor (Pirrong (1996) , Domowitz and Steil (1999) ), the majority of authors argue that higher information asymmetries in computerised trading lead to higher transaction costs (Venkataraman (2001) , Theissen (2002) , , Jain et al. (2006) ).
Previous studies either compare floor and electronic trading platforms at the same time (Venkataraman (2001), Grammig et al. (2001) , Theissen (2002) ), or they investigate how the market properties change over time when an electronic system is introduced instead of the existing trading floor (Gilbert and Rijken (2006) ). In our study, this is reversed in that part of the trading time in the electronic system is abolished. This reversal is intriguing in itself as one might expect the traditional floor trading to be more prone to cuts in opening hours than highly automated electronic trading platforms. Moreover, this setting provides a natural experiment to study potential transfers of investors from Xetra to the floor as it enables us to examine continuous trading of the same stocks in two trading mechanisms at the same stock exchange.
Generally, the higher the information asymmetry is, the less liquid and less deep a market.
While traders on the floor have better knowledge about the order flow and the identity of their trading counterparties, those who trade on a computerised system have easier access to fundamental information and prices on other markets (Pirrong (1996) ). Pirrong compares theoretically and empirically the liquidity of German Bund Futures contracts traded simultaneously on the open-outcry platform LIFFE and electronically on Deutsche Terminboerse DTB. He finds that the computerised system offers lower spreads and is more liquid and deeper than the floor system. Domowitz and Steil (1999) examine the total execution costs on various U.S. trading platforms and hypothesise that electronic trading systems compete for traders with floor-based ones. The degree of automation and the resulting lower running costs of a computerised platform should lead to lower overall execution costs in an electronic system than the floor can offer. In fact, they find that electronic markets provide more favourable conditions to investors than the floor for trading in over-the-counter stocks. As for trading listed issues, commissions for traditional brokers are so high that they over-compensate the lower implicit execution costs on the floor.
In contrast to these studies, there is evidence for the floor offering lower execution costs and hence more favourable conditions for investors than electronic trading systems. Theissen (2002) compares the transaction costs on the Frankfurt floor with those in the electronic system (then IBIS, now Xetra) and finds the electronic system to offer lower bid-ask spreads for actively traded stocks. The floor, however, offers more favourable conditions for less frequently traded stocks, with the market share of less liquid stocks being lower in the electronic system than on the floor.
Theissen attributes the higher execution costs on the electronic platform to the adverse selection component of the spread.
Several related studies investigate the influence of market makers on information asymmetry. Jain et al. (2006) examine the price impact for stocks traded parallel in the electronic system SETS and on the dealer market at the London Stock Exchange. They find empirical evidence for the computerised trading system to attract relatively more informed trades than the non-anonymous dealer market. Similarly, conclude for Nasdaq stocks that informed traders prefer electronic systems over market makers. Benveniste et al. (1992) construct a theoretical model for the spread whose primary implication is that information asymmetries are lower in a non-anonymous market. However, Lehmann and Modest (1994) examine empirically the Tokyo Stock Exchange's success in providing liquidity without a specialist on the floor and the electronic system. They conclude that the Tokyo Stock Exchange is a well-functioning, liquid market despite the lack of market makers. Ding and Lau (2001) investigate how the Stock Exchange of Singaporewhich includes a screen-based dealer system that has no specialist -performs relative to the NYSE and Nasdaq. They find, to a large extent, similarities between the Singapore Stock Exchange and the NYSE and Nasdaq.
Bringing forward the closing time of Xetra is not an endogenous variable ) and therefore provides an ideal institutional setting to study the extent to which investors transfer from Xetra to the floor, and to ascertain the type of investors that accept trading on a non-anonymous system when the anonymous one closes earlier. This should yield insights into the perceptions of traders regarding the relative market qualities of both trading platforms. As information asymmetry impacts directly on market quality, we examine whether it is primarily uninformed investors that accept the floor as a substitute of the electronic system. Theissen (2002) finds differences in relative execution costs between large and small stocks. This is consistent with Dennis and Weston (2001) , who suggest that institutional investors are generally better informed than individual ones, and Falkenstein (1996) , who concludes that mutual funds prefer large stocks.
We therefore conduct our analysis separately for large and for small stocks, which might give further indications regarding the type of investors that transfer to the floor. Finally, we draw conclusions regarding the design of a trading platform.
We expect trading volume to increase sharply on the floor in November 2003 after 5.30pm, driven by uninformed trades which can thereby be settled at a time when Xetra is closed. As informed traders prefer the anonymity of the electronic system (e.g. ), this might lead, under otherwise equal conditions, to a higher fraction of informed traders in Xetra, thereby increasing the adverse selection costs and hence making the computerised platform less In order to empirically analyse the relative market quality on both trading platforms over time, section 2 introduces the dataset and the methodology before section 3 describes the empirical results. Section 4 summarises our findings and concludes.
Data and Methodology

Data
Our dataset captures three months prior to, and after, the bringing forward of the Xetra closing Transactions data include timestamp, price, and number of shares.
Quotes are only available for Xetra as this platform has one orderbook from which we received the data. On the floor, by contrast, several market makers operate who are not obliged to publish their orderbooks. For this institutional reason, it is impossible to obtain a comprehensive set of quotes for the floor. Quotes data for Xetra comprise bid and ask prices with timestamps and the respective number of shares. The relative spreads, which are reported multiplied with 100, are calculated as the difference between ask and bid prices divided by the spread midpoint.
We conduct common plausibility checks on the data (Madhavan et al. (1997) , Chung and Van Ness (2001) ) and eliminate observations with negative spreads, with negative or zero trading volume, and entries with changes in absolute spreads, spread midpoints or returns larger than 50 percent as well as overnight returns. We only use data from continuous trading, i.e. we exclude auctions and observations outside the trading times. This results in a dataset containing 1,106,147 transactions for the floor, 10,376,549 transactions for Xetra, and 28,165,410 quotes.
Transactions that market makers settle in their own accounts should also be eliminated since they do not pay spreads to themselves. However, we cannot identify such transactions in the dataset, and their impact on overall trading volume should be negligible for large stocks in which institutional investors trade actively. Since our results are driven by large stocks, we do not pursue this further.
Methodology
In order to analyse the anonymous and the non-anonymous trading platforms over time, we apply descriptive methods from the market microstructure literature, and we decompose the bid-ask spreads following George et al. (1991) . The methodology of Venkataraman (2001) cannot be applied here because quotes data are not available for both markets that we are comparing. For the descriptive analysis, we choose the turnover as a proxy for trading volume, transaction size as an indicator for the presence of institutional investors, and return volatility (as calculated in ) and the relative bid-ask spread (Glosten and Milgrom (1985) ) to reflect information asymmetry. The trading time is split into 15-minute intervals, and within each interval the average is calculated per share on each trading day following Abhyankar et al. (1997) .
Rather than aggregating the shares into a portfolio, this method preserves the characteristics of each stock in each interval.
Turnover is calculated as the cumulative product of price and number of shares, transaction size gives the number of shares per trade, and return volatility is computed cumulatively across each intervall with the return being (p t − p t−1 )/p t−1 . 1 The volatility and the spreads are reported in percent. We employ t-tests to determine whether the means in the indicators have changed significantly over time. Statistically, this is identical to estimating dummy regressions and t-testing the estimated coefficients.
As there are no spread data available for the floor, we estimate it following Roll (1984) . Alternatively, transaction costs could be approximated as in Lesmond et al. (1999) . Their results are strongly correlated with those of Roll (1984) so that the choice of model should have very little impact on the interpretation of the estimates in our setting. The basis of the estimation in Roll (1984) is the autocovariance γ T of the returns:
where T is the last period for which a return observation is available. Spread T can be interpreted as the average relative spread since the returns that feed into the estimation are relative. In case of γ T > 0 it is not defined. George at al. (1991) propose two methods for decomposing the spread into its order processing and adverse selection cost components. Under the first approach, continuously compounded returns ln(p t /p t−1 ) are used, whereas the second version takes the difference between this return and the logarithm of the bid price return to compute a synthetic spread Spread calc . In either case, the regression
is estimated where Spread calc,i is the calculated spread, Spread obs,i the observed spread, and i denotes the observation. Spread calc,i is approximated across 1-hour intervals, and Spread obs,i is averaged across these. This ensures that the estimates are more reliable than with 15-minute intervals. α 1 measures the order processing costs and (1 − α 1 ) are the adverse selection costs.
While the constant has to be included in the model specification (George et al. (1991) ), it is not needed to determine the estimated components of the spread. Whenα 1 < 0 then the adverse selection costs are set to 1. As there are no observed spread data Spread obs,i available for the floor, we can only decompose the spreads from Xetra.
Empirical Results
We expected a sharp increase in trading volume on the floor in November 2003 after 5.30pm. In fact, turnover almost doubles there in the evening. As can be seen from Panel A in Table 1 Insert Table 1 about here The results of the cross-sectional analysis, which are not reported here in detail but are available on request, suggest that the sharp growth in trading volume on the floor is driven by large stocks, while daytime turnover in Xetra for small stocks increases. This is an indication that primarily institutional investors transfer to the floor in the evening, while individual investors trading in small stocks remain with the electronic trading platform and adjust their trading time.
Since transactions in Xetra tend to be larger than those settled on the floor, an increase in transaction size on the floor could be interpreted as further evidence for investors transferring to the floor when Xetra is closed. As Panel B of Table 1 We conclude that investors trading in large stocks transfer to the floor when Xetra closes earlier.
As a larger fraction of market participants in Xetra are informed traders than on the floor ), and since those traders that appear to have transferred tend to be well informed,
we expect this movement of investors to increase information asymmetry on the floor in November 2003. We investigate this by analysing return volatility and the bid-ask spread.
However, the volatility decreased on both trading systems, with the floor showing a significant reduction in the daytime and in the evening (Panel C, Table 1 ). Following , we interpret this as a reduction in asymmetric information on the floor. It therefore appears that the transfer of investors from Xetra to the floor does not result in higher information asymmetries on the floor. This can be explained in two ways: Either those investors that are prepared to transfer to the floor are not informed, or they are informed but the trades they choose to settle on the floor are not information-based. Either way, this transfer should increase information asymmetry in Xetra under otherwise equal conditions. Since we are investigating a dynamic market across six months, holding everything else equal is too restrictive an assumption. Therefore, we also observe an overall reduction in volatility in Xetra which could be attributed to a growth in liquidity.
The bid-ask spread is another measure of information asymmetry as it contains a component that compensates the market maker for losses incurred when trading against informed investors.
The overall spread decreases in both trading systems, with the reduction being particularly sharp on the floor in the evening in November 2003 (Panel D, Table 1 ). For actively traded stocks, the decrease in the spread is so large that the usual pattern of lower spreads in the daytime than in the evening reverses. Thus, for large stocks, the daytime spread is larger than that in the evening from November 2003 onwards. The reduction in spreads in Xetra could be driven by the increase in liquidity or other factors beyond the transfer of traders to the floor.
As explained in section 2.2, the adverse selection component of the spread can be analysed for Xetra only. Table 2 shows the mean adverse selection costs for the first version of the spread decomposition according to George et al. (1991) . This cost component of the spread does not change significantly, with the time after 5.30pm scoring higher relative costs than the daytime.
Thus, the trades that are affected by bringing forward the closing time of Xetra are informed to a larger extent than the trades in the daytime. In light of the results of the descriptive analysis, one might expect an increase in adverse selection costs in November 2003, since primarily informed investors appear to remain with Xetra, while uninformed ones prefer the floor. We believe the impact of transfers from Xetra in the evening to the daytime to be too small to induce statistically significant results.
Insert Table 2 about here
It should be noted that the German stock market is fragmented from 9.00am to 5.30pm into floor and Xetra trading platforms. After 5.30pm, only the floor exists, which enables market makers to observe the entire market more easily than in the daytime. This enables them to learn faster, so that information is incorporated more promptly into quotes. This will also make floor trading For turnover, transaction size, return volatility and spread, large stocks drive the empirical results. There are at least two possible explanations for this finding. First, Xetra has a much larger market share in large stocks than in smaller ones. It is therefore plausible that primarily large stocks are affected by bringing forward the Xetra closing time, which is what we see reflected in the data. Second, consistent with this interpretation is Falkenstein's (1996) result that institutional investors prefer large stocks over small ones. Therefore it is likely that primarily institutional investors transferred to the floor in November 2003, but continued to settle informed trades on the anonymous electronic platform. It can be concluded that non-anonymous trading platforms offer favourable conditions to uninformed traders, while the anonymity of a computerised platform is preferred for settling informed trades.
As a robustness check, we conducted our analysis of turnover, transaction size, volatility, spread and the spread decomposition for each of the six months from August 2003 to January 2004 separately for either trading platform. The results are not reported in detail but are available from the authors on request. Apart from the year-end observation which we identified for Xetra, the prominent changes in all these time series occurred in November 2003. We regard this as support for our attributing those changes to the earlier closing time in Xetra. Furthermore, we decomposed the spread following the second approach of George et al. (1991) . The results are identical with the ones reported above and can also be obtained from the authors.
Summary and Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate about the relative qualities of floor and There are various alleys for methodological extensions of this paper. Firstly, a model as in Easley et al. (1996) could be estimated. However, this approach is based on the assumption that information events occur only outside the trading hours, and the market maker learns the information throughout the trading day. As a result, splitting the trading time into 9.00am to 5.30pm and 5.31pm to 8.00pm is not meaningful. In light of our empirical results, which underscore the sharp differences on the floor between daytime and evening, we would not be able to interpret the probabilities of informed trading with respect to the research questions in this paper.
Secondly, the price impact of a trade could be estimated as in Hasbrouck (1991) . The core of this method is to model the interactions between trades and quotes. As quotes data are not available for the floor, this can only be estimated for Xetra. Like with the spread decomposition performed above, this means that results cannot be compared between the floor and the electronic trading platforms, which is the primary scope of this paper. Thirdly, the effective spread could be used for the descriptive analysis and for the spread decomposition separately to the quoted spreads.
This spread measure allows for trade executions within the quoted spread (Venkataraman (2001) ).
Once again, this would only be possible for Xetra. Finally, depth is another indicator of market quality and could also be examined in the context of this paper. However, Lee et al. (1993) find that spreads are negatively correlated with depth so that qualitative results regarding the latter can be inferred from our analysis of spreads.
More generally, further empirical research should take into account the explicit trading costs as well. Fees and commissions that investors face for transactions they settle on the floor might outweigh the relative benefits of the non-anonymous trading platform (Domowitz and Steil (1999) ).
Since institutional investors tend to have their own dealers on the floor, they might be able to save on those fees. This could be another reason why we observe primarily institutional investors transferring to the floor. Table 2 : Relative Adverse Selection Costs in Xetra based on George et al. (1991) 
